Elu Metziot shiur #13, 23b -24a

  • Rav Joshua Amaru


Introduction to the Study of Talmud
By Rav Josh Amaru

Elu Metziot shiur #13,  23b -24a.

Today's shiur includes the vocabulary list for the shiur itself. If you wish to consult the full cumulative vocabulary list, it is found at

As usual, the citations to the text of the gemara are linked to the online scan of the daf, for those who do not have an open gemara before them.  The gemara can be found on-line at

Key words and phrases are marked in blue, and their translation/explanation can be seen by placing the cursor over them.  Other vocabulary words are marked in red and can be found on the vocabulary list at the end of the shiur.  Particularly important vocabulary words will have a link to the vocabulary list. 

Summary of last week's shiur:  Last week we discussed the nature of simanim as they appear in different contexts.  We investigated characteristics such as number, size, weight and location and saw when and how they can and cannot function as simanim.

    This week will continue our explication of the mishna.  Before we start the gemara, take a look back at the mishna on daf 21a.  As you can see, we have discussed nearly the whole mishna and all that remains is Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar's ruling about "klei anporia."  The gemara now turns to discuss this ruling, but first it must clarify the meaning of the term "klei anporia."  Turn back to daf 23b and learn from "Rabi Shimon ben Elazar ...רבי שמעון בן אלעזר " (nine lines from the bottom) until "ve-la mehadrinan lei ולא מהדרינן ליה." (second to last line).  Schematic analysis lines 1-5

Notice the quote from the mishna, which was inserted by the printer as the heading for the our sugya.  As is often the case, the quote is shortened and the word וכו'י, vekhulei, meaning 'etc.' appears.  Now I have not done a scientific survey, but in my experience, almost every time that the heading quote includes וכו'י, the gemara's focus is on the section of the quote represented by the 'etc.'   In other words, it is always a good idea to go back to the full text of the mishna and to see the whole passage being discussed.  If the quote in the gemara is incomplete, do not rely on it as it is very likely not the focus of the gemara's interest.    

      As usual, the gemara opens with a quote from the mishna.  Before discussing the legal implications of R. Shimon ben Elazar's ruling, the gemara first clarifies for us what that ruling actually is.  'Klei anporia' are explained, to translate the Aramaic idiom literally, as:  'new vessels that the eye is not satisfied with.'

Anporia אנפוריא.  The word probably comes from the Greek emporia, meaning trade or merchandise.  Klei anporia would thus be articles set aside for trade rather than personal use.  This fits nicely with the gemara's understanding  that these items will not be recognizable by their owners.  See Rashi,  s.v., she-la sav'atan שלא שבעתן, (ninth line from the bottom on 23b) for a creative rendering of the word as an acronym
  What does this mean?  Let's look in Rashi,  s.v., she-la sav'atan שלא שבעתן (ninth line from the bottom on 23b).  People often have a general familiarity with their belongings such that they have no trouble recognizing them, even if they are unable to to explicitly state identifying simanim. I have no trouble picking out my coat from all the others on the coat rack, even though many of them are blue with grey lining.  Klei anporia, says the gemara, are objects that are clearly so new that the owner will not be sufficiently familiar with them to identify them by recognition alone. 

    The gemara, having clarified what klei anporia are, is still troubled by R. Shimon's statement.  Why is is relevant whether or not the item is new such that the owner is not familiar with it?  If the item has a siman, the owner can identify it and claim it it regardless of the degree of his or her general familiarity with the object.  If it does not have a siman,  the owner has no way of demonstrating to the finder that the lost object is his - why should the finder give it to the owner just because he says it is his?

    The gemara explains that there are indeed situations in which the finder should return an object based upon someone's bare assertion that the lost object is his or hers.  It depends upon the claimant.  If the claimant is a talmid chakham, a scholar, whose word can be trusted, one must return the lost object to him when he recognizes it by sight, even if he cannot present a siman.  R. Shimon ben Elazar teaches us that with new articles, that could not have become familiar to their owners, one does not have to announce the find and return it when recognized on sight by a talmid chakham

    Some of you may be wondering what is going on.  The gemara above has just concluded that one is also required to announce objects that do not have a siman.  The only things the finder can keep are new merchandise without simanim that could not possibly be recognized by their owner.  To be sure, one need not return a lost object to someone who claims he recognizes it unless,

    1.  that person can conclusively identify the object with simanim, or;
    2.  that person is known to be particularly honest and reliable such that we are convinced that if he or she claims to recognize the lost object , it must belong to them. 
However, the central distinction that we have discussed for so long, between items with simanim and items without, seems to have becomes more or less moot.  It appears that one must announce nearly everything, in case the owner is a talmid chakham, who can recognize it by sight.  What happened to the notion that when one finds an object that has no simanim the finder may keep it, as we assume that the owner has been mityaesh?  We are now saying that this is not the case.  Anything that could potentially be recognized must be announced!

    This issue was addressed by Ramban.  Ramban asks how is it that the mishna lists items without simanim that may be kept by the finder?  Do we not need to worry that perhaps these items belonged to a talmid chakham who can recognize them by sight and claim them.  According to the gemara's conclusion, we should have to

RAMBAN רמב"ן
Rabbi Moses ben Nachman (Ramban, Nachmanides) was born in Gerona, Spain in 1194, and died in Israel, 1270. Ramban was the outstanding Torah authority of his generation. After he left Spain, his famous disciples, Rashba and Rabbi Aaron Halevi (to whom the Sefer Ha-Chinuch is often ascribed), took over as spiritual leaders of Spanish Jewry. Ramban's multifaceted literary activities included commentaries on the Bible and Talmud, halachic codes, responsa, works on mysticism and philosophy, and sermons. In 1267, in the aftermath of a public debate with the apostate Pablo Christiani, which was forced upon Ramban by the king and Christian clergy of Catalonia, and decided in favor of the Christians from the outset, Ramban was banished from Spain. At age 73, Ramban took the difficult and dangerous trip to Israel and fulfilled his life's dream of settling in the holy land. There Ramban restored the Jewish community in Jerusalem, which had previously been destroyed by invading Tartars. Accordingly, Ramban is considered the father of modern Jewish settlement in Jerusalem. Like Maimonides and many other Spanish rabbinic scholars, Ramban was a practicing physician. (Bar Ilan Responsa CD).

announce nearly everything!  We can expand and generalize Ramban's question.  As we have pointed out many times, the deciding factor in determining what to do about lost objects is yeush.  The problem is always how one establishes yeush, since the finder does not know the identity of the original owner.  Until now, the usually determining feature has been simanim, such that we may presume yeush in the absence of simanim.  Since the owner has no way of identifying himself as such to the finder, and thus recovering the object, he or she is mityaesh.  Hence the finder may keep an object that has no simanim.  By introducing this notion that a talmid chakham can claim an object upon recognizance, we undermine the whole argument for the presumption of yeush.  Scholars will never be mityaesh, even when they have no simanim, since they can recover their object anyway.  The finder, who has no idea if the loser of an object is a talmid chakham, can therefore never presume yeush and keep the object. 

    Ramban's language is often difficult so I will sum up his answer for you.  The text and translation appear here.  Ramban offers three answers to his question:

1.  We should distinguish between different types of lost objects.  The items listed in the mishna which may be kept without announcing are not things people use regularly - they are either foods or money or generic materials that have no specific identity.  They will never be recognizable on sight and thus never need to be announced.  However, tools, clothing and the like, that people do become intimately familiar with, will indeed need to be announced even when there is no siman, in order to allow a talmid chakham to come forward and identify his lost object. 

2.  In addition, claims Ramban, the requirement to announce recognizable items that do not have simanim is not universal.  It is limited to locales in which such talmidei chakhamim (pl.) are frequently found.  One would need to announce a recognizable object only if it is found in such a place.  In an ordinary location, there is no requirement to announce since it is extremely unlikely that the loser was one of these reliable talmidei chakhamim, and the finder may keep the lost object.  

3.  Ramban quotes the opinion of Ravad who holds that siman-less objects do not require regular announcing.  They must be announced only in the study halls and synagogues where talmidei chakhamim are found.  According to this position, claims Ramban, if, after three days or so, there is no response to one's announcements in the study halls etc., one may presume that the loser was not a talmid chakham and keep the lost object. 

    The three explanations are distinct but not mutually exclusive.  In the first, we accept that the divide is no longer between objects with simanim and objects without.  Ramban merely points out that there remain many instances of lost objects that are not recognizable by sight and thus may be kept by the finder.  The second explanation is more radical.  It institutes a distinction, which does not appear in the gemara, between locales in which talmidei chakhamim are found and those where they are not.  According to this explanation, the scope of the consideration that a talmid chakham may have lost it is severely limited.  Generally one does not have to worry that the found object  belonged to a talmid chakham.  The presumption of yeush remains with siman-less objects unless it was found in a place where it is likely to have been lost by a talmid chakham.  Only then does one need to announce an object that is potentially recognizable. 

    The last explanation, brought in the name of Ravad, addresses the question from a different angle.  Siman-less objects do not need to be announced in the same way as objects with simanim.  Since only talmidei chakhamim are candidates for recovery through recognition on sight, one need announce only to them.  Accordingly, claims Ramban, once a short period of time has passed with no response, the object 'reverts' to a regular siman-less lost object, and may be kept by the owner. 

    We have focussed at such length on this point that a talmid chakham does not need simanim because it appeared to shake up the system of rules as we have understood it until now.  The Ramban addresses this concern by limiting the scope of the "talmid chakham rule", as above.  We will now turn to the definition of the talmid chakham to whom this rule applies.  Learn, on dapim 23b-24a from "de-amar Rav Yehuda amar Shmuel... דאמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל" until "kaftei ve-odi כפתיה ואודי."  Lines 6-9 in the schematic analysis.

    The gemara quotes a statement of Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel.  The Rabbis diverge from the truth concerning only three subjects:  tractate, bed and hospitality.  What do these mean?  Why is it permitted to lie about these things?  Look in Rashi,  at the end of 23b and the beginning of 24a, s.v. be-masekhet במסכת, s.v. be-furia בפוריא , s.v. be-ushpiza באושפיזא.  As Rashi explains, one is allowed to lie if the alternative is to appear arrogant, or if the true response would not conform to the value of sexual modesty, or in order to protect someone else from harm.  The gemara explains that this is the definition of a reliable talmid chakham - someone who can be counted upon to lie only under such circumstances and never for personal gain.

The question of when it is permitted to lie is an interesting one but we will not go into it here.  I will just point out that the Rambam, (Laws of Robbery and Lost Objects 14:13 הל' גזילה ואבדה יד:יג) records this definition of a talmid chakham who does not lie. However, he adds another case, based upon Bavli Yevamot 65b, where it is permitted to lie -  in the pursuit of peace between two people, one is permitted to "add or subtract in order to inspire affection between them."


    Mar Zutra points out that the application of this definition is that one returns a lost object on recognizance only to someone of such high moral standards.  Since we know that such a person would not lie, we trust that the lost object is his, and return it.  Someone who is known to be freer with the truth does not inspire this trust and one need not return the object without proof.

   In the context of its discussion of the relationship between moral qualities,  the gemara records a story concerning Mar Zutra. Mar Zutra, was present when a a silver cup was stolen in a hotel.  When he noticed a student (presumably staying at the same hotel) who dried his hands using someone else's towel, Mar Zutra accused him of the theft, as this was clearly a person who was not careful with other people's property.  The student was detained and confessed to the theft. 

    This little story, in my opinion, is inserted as an elaboration of the relationship between being a a talmid chakham and reliability.  To be called a talmid chakham,  one must live up to the highest standards - never to lie except when dishonesty is the best moral option. Someone who is scrupulous about even the smallest white lie can be relied upon such that his word is his bond and ordinary requirements of proof are waived.  The story illustrates how the inverse is also true.  Someone who is unscrupulous about small things - drying one's hands with someone else's towel - is legitimately suspect about larger things such as outright theft. 

Another interesting issue is the nature of the requirement that the person be a talmid chakham.  The gemara assumes that anyone who is a Torah scholar can be presumed to be extremely honest.  This presumption has unfortunately been undermined from time to time, but hopefully can still be maintained.  What about the converse situation - someone who is known to be careful never to lie but is not a talmid chakham?  Must one give such a person back his or her lost object upon recognizance or may one demand proof (i.e. simanim)? 

Remember that there are two factors involved in the return of a lost object:  First we must establish whether the object actually belonged to the claimant.  This can be done by his presenting simanim, or, when he can be trusted not to lie, by his merely saying that he recognizes it.   However, there is another factor:  Was the owner mityaesh?  Even if we believe him that the object was his, if he did not think he could recover it in the absence of simanim,  then presumably he was mityaesh and the finder can keep it.  In order to claim something on recognizance, you need not only to be reliable but also to know that others regard you as reliable, so that the you are confident that people will give you back the lost object without simanim.  Only then can we assume you were not mityaesh

So the question is:  Are there other people, besides talmidei chakhamim, who we may presume are not mityaesh when they lose something without simanim?  The gemara does not give us an answer.  .  Most Rishonim understand that the gemara refers to a talmid chakham only as an indicator of honesty (see Ramban et.al. on Hulin 96a) and thus it is at least possible that someone else who is known to be honest may also claim a lost object upon recognizance.  Perhaps, since this person never lies, we can ask him if he was mityaesh

    However, some Rishonim (see Or Zarua Bava Metzia No. 65) insist that one must return an object upon recognizance only to a person who is a talmid chakham, and can be so identified by his style of dress (based upon Bavli Shabat 114a).  This position can be interpreted in two ways: 

1.  The presumption of yeush is waived only for a recognizable talmid chakham.  The Rabbis, by declaring that a talmid chakham can be trusted to recognize his belongings, created a dynamic in which such a talmid chakham would not be mityaesh upon discovery of a loss,. since it is still recoverable  Some other person would not have this dynamic and since he or she would be unable to recover the lost object, they would be mityaesh from it.  .

 2.  We only trust a talmid chakham to recognize something on sight.  He can be presumed to be a careful and precise person who would not let his imagination fool him.  A regular person might imagine something belongs to him without that being the case.  According to this interpretation, we return something to a talmid chakham on recognizance for two reasons; a. We only trust talmidei chakhamim not to lie;  
b. Only with a talmid chakham can we trust recognizance as a means of identifying the owner of an object.  With other people there is always a danger that they imagine it belongs to them when it doesn't.


Learn now, on 24a, from "Tanya: modeh R. Shimon ben Elazar תניא: מודה רבי שמעון בן אלעזר until "be-vad echad בבד אחד."  Lines 10-12 in the schematic analysis. 

    The gemara concludes our discussion with a baraita that elaborates R. Shimon ben Elazar's statement in the mishna.  In the baraita we find that the gemara's definition of "klei anporia" as items that the owner is not sufficiently familiar with already appears in the name of R. Shimon ben Elazar.   He then gives a list of examples of such items.  When found by themselves, these items may be kept by the finder and need not be announced.  If, however they are found in pairs, they must be announced.  The number, as Rashi s.v. chayav le-hakhriz explains, counts as a siman.    The gemara is not sure of the meaning of one of the items on this list, "badei" and proceeds to explicate it, based upon usage elsewhere.

    The subject of recognition on sight (tevi'ut 'ayin) and its implications for hashavat aveida can be discussed further, but we will conclude here.  As we have seen, the question of when one must return a lost object has become complicated.  As was the case in the sugya of yeush she-lo mi-da'at, the absence of simanim is not enough to make the find permissible to the finder.  This time we learned that there is another class of objects, objects the owner can presumably recognize, that also may be recoverable by the owner.  This is only the case if the owner is a talmid chakham, since we can believe he is telling the truth despite the fact that he has no evidence.  In any case, the finder may not keep for himself objects of this sort but must announce them in order to provide a talmid chakham the opportunity to recover his property. 

Schematic Analysis #13

Schematic analysis of the gemara daf 23b-24a from "Rabi Shimon ben Elazar ...רבי שמעון בן אלעזר "  until be-vad echad בבד אחד.

Translation of gemara Schematic Analysis Text of gemara 23b

1. R. Shimon ben Elazar says, etc.

Quote from the mishna

1.  רבי שמעון בן אלעזר אומר וכו'.

2.  What is meant by 'anporia'? Question about a term used in the mishna

2.  מאי אנפוריא? 

3.   Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: New articles with which one is not yet sufficiently familiar.  Explanation of term.

3. אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל: כלים חדשים שלא שבעתן העין.

4.   In what circumstances? If they have a siman, what does it matter if they are not yet sufficiently familar?  If they do not have a siman, -what does it matter if they are familar enough? Difficulty with the mishna's ruling.

4.  היכי דמי? אי אית בהו סימן - כי לא שבעתן העין מאי הוי? אי דלית בהו סימן - כי שבעתן העין מאי הוי? - 

5.[The mishna] is only [talking about vessels] that have no siman. [The point] is significant [in regard to the question whether the lost articles] should be returned to [a claimant who is] a talmid chakham [who recognises them] by sight:  If [it is a case where] he is sufficiently familiar, he is sure to know them, and we give them back to him. But if he is not sufficiently familar with them,  he cannot be sure to know them, and we do not give them back to him. Explanation of the case in the mishna.

5.   לעולם דלית בהו סימן, נפקא מינה לאהדורי לצורבא מרבנן בטביעות עינא. שבעתן העין - קים ליה בגוייהו, ומהדרינן ליה. כי לא שבעתן העין - לא קים ליה בגוייהו, ולא מהדרינן ליה.

6. For Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: In the following three matters learned men do not [necessarily] tell the truth: In matters of a tractate, bed, [24a]  and hospitality.  Amoraic statement

6. דאמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל: בהני תלת מילי עבידי רבנן דמשנו במלייהו: במסכת, ובפוריא, [דף כד עמוד א] ובאושפיזא.

7.  What is the point [of this observation]? Relevance question

7.  מאי נפקא מינה?

8.  Mar Zutra said: [It is important in regard to the question] of returning a lost article, [recognised] by sight: If we know that [the claimant] does not tell the truth in only  those three matters, we give it back to him, but if he does not speak the truth also in other matters we do not give it back to him. Explanation how the above statement is relevant to the explanation of the mishna.

8.  אמר מר זוטרא: לאהדורי ליה אבידתא בטביעות עינא. אי ידעינן ביה דלא משני אלא בהני תלת - מהדרינן ליה, ואי משני במילי אחריני - לא מהדרינן ליה.

9.Mar Zutra the pious once had a silver vessel stolen from him  in a hotel. When he saw a student wash his hands and dry them on someone else's garment he said, 'This is the person [who stole the vessel], as he has no consideration for the property of his fellow.' [The student] was then detained, and he confessed.

Story related to above point. 

9.  מר זוטרא חסידא אגניב ליה כסא דכספא מאושפיזא, חזיא לההוא בר בי רב דמשי ידיה ונגיב בגלימא דחבריה. אמר: היינו האי דלא איכפת ליה אממונא דחבריה. כפתיה ואודי.

10. It has been taught: 'R. Shimon ben Elazar admits that new vessels which are sufficiently familiar have to be announced. And these are  new vessels which are not considered to be sufficiently familar such that one does not need to announce them:  poles of needles, knitting needles, and bundles of axes. All these objects mentioned above are permitted only if they are found singly, but if found in twos one must announce them.'

Baraita related to above discussion

10.  תניא: מודה רבי שמעון בן אלעזר בכלים חדשים ששבעתן העין שחייב להכריז. ואלו הן כלים חדשים שלא שבעתן העין, שאינו חייב להכריז - כגון בדי מחטין וצינוריות, ומחרוזות של קרדומות. כל אלו שאמרו אימתי מותרים - בזמן שמצאן אחד אחד, אבל מצאן שנים שנים - חייב להכריז.

11.  What are badei ['poles']? Rods. Clarification of terminology

11.  מאי בדי - שוכי,

12.  And why are they called badei ['poles']? Because an object on which things hang is called 'bad' as is stated there: One leaf on one branch ['bad']. explanation of terminology

12.  ואמאי קרו ליה בדי? - דבר דתלו ביה מידי, בד קרו ליה. כי ההוא דתנן התם: עלה אחד בבד אחד.




Selections from Rashi and Ramban daf 23b


Rashi Text

she-la sav'atan, that [the eye] is not satisfied with them - [the owner] is not yet used to their appearance and use such that he will recognize them well.  The term 'anporia' is an acronym for 'ein' 'po' 'ra'aya' (no proof from here).

שלא שבעתן - עדיין לא הורגל בראייתן ותשמישן שיהא מכירן יפה, ולשון אנפוריא נוטריקון: אין פה ראיה.

be-masechet, in [matters of ] tractate - [when someone asks him] 'do you know this tractate?' even thought he does know it, he will say to him that he does not, as an expression of humility.

במסכת - יש בידך מסכת פלוני סדורה בגירסא או לאו, ואף על גב שסדורה היא לו - יאמר לו לאו, ומדת ענוה היא.

be-furia in [matters of] bed - [when someone asks him] 'did you have sexual relations?" he will say that he did not as an expression of modesty.

בפוריא - שימשת מטתך, יאמר לאו, מדת צניעות הוא.

be-ushpiza, in [matters of ] hospitality - he was asked about his host if he was gracious and he said that he was not.  This is a good attribute (i.e. a kind thing to do) so that immoral people will not rush to stay with him (the host), and waste his money. 

באושפיזא - שאלוהו על אושפיזו אם קבלו בסבר פנים יפות, ואמר לאו - מדה טובה היא, כדי שלא יקפצו בו בני אדם שאינן מהוגנין לבא תמיד עליו, ויכלו את ממונו.

chayav le-hakhriz, [one is] obligated to announce - since number is a siman.

חייב להכריז - דמנין הוי סימן.

Novelae of Ramban, Bava Metzia 23b

la tzrikha, no, it is necessary [to announce] in order to return it to a talmid chakham who recognizes it by sight.  Thie is difficult:  if everything familiar must be announced for a talmid chakham [who may have lost it], how is it that the mishna taught in the reisha 'these objects belong to him [the finder]?  One should announce them in case [the owner is] a talmid chakham to whom it can be returned when it is recognized by sight!

We can explain that all the items in the mishna are not kelim (clothes and utensils and such) and one can presume that they are not recognizable by sight.  It also appears that we do not consider the possibility [that the owner is] a talmid chakham unless [the object] is found in a place that talmidei chakhamim (pl.) are commonly found, like the talmid chakham's marketplace (as is mentioned further on).  However, when found in another place, we do not worry about [the loser being] a talmid chakham, and all the more so if [the object] is found in a place where  there are not usually talmidei chakhamim

I have seen that the Ravad has written:  "it appears to me that this announcing (of an object without simanim) is different from other announcings.  It takes place only in the synagogues and study halls where talmidei chakhamim are commonly found."  According to this quote, one can explain "these belong to him [the finder]' in the mishna as referring to after he or she has announced [the loss] in the study halls.  Once one has announced for three days or so in the study halls, we no longer concern ourselves with [the possiblity that the loser was] a talmid chakham.   

חידושי רמב"ן לבבא מציעא דף כג עמ' ב.

לא צריכא לאהדורי לצורבא מרבנן בטביעות עינא. ק"ל אי כל דבר ששבעתו העין חייב להכריז משום צורבא מרבנן וכדקתני ומודה ר"ש וכו', היכי קתני רישא אלו מציאות שלו ליכריז דילמא איכא צורבא מרבנן דליהדריה ניהליה בטביעות עינא, ואיכא למימר דכל הני דמתני לאו כלים נינהו ולית בהו טביעות עינא מסתמא, ומשמע נמי דלא חיישינן לצורבא מרבנן אלא היכא דאשתכח באתרא דשכיחי רבנן כגון בשוקא דרבנן כדלקמן, אבל היכא שנמצאת במקום אחר לא חיישינן לצורבא מרבנן, וכל שכן באתרא דליכא רבנן דליכא למיחש, וראיתי להראב"ד ז"ל שכתב נראה לי שזו ההכרזה אינה כשאר ההכרזות שאינה אלא בבתי כנסיות ובבתי מדרשות דשכיחי רבנן, ולפי דבריו איכא למימר מאי הרי אלו שלו דקתני מתני', בתר דאכריז בבתי מדרשות קאמר דכיון דאכריז שלשה ימים או יותר בבתי מדרשות שוב אין חוששין לצורבא מרבנן.




Key Gemara Terms

nafka mina: lit. comes out of it, the point or significance of it.

נפקא מינה

avidi: are likely, are liable



kim lei: lit. it is established for him, he knows


קים ליה

General vocabulary

ushpiza: 1.  hotel, guest house, 2. hospitality



gelima: garment.



mashi: he washed



meshanu be-milayhu: lit. change with their words, lie, diverge from the truth

משנים דבריהם

משנו במלייהו

avidi: are likely, are liable



nafka mina: lit. comes out of it, the point or significance of it.

נפקא מינה

tzurba me-rabanan: lit. a student of the Rabbis, a talmid chakham, a scholar. 

תלמיד חכם

צורבא מרבנן

kim lei: lit. it is established for him, he knows

קים ליה