Parashat Toldot: The Obligation of a Blind Person Regarding Mitzvot
The Weekly Mitzva
Yeshivat Har Etzion
PARASHAT TOLEDOT
Shiur #06: The Obligation of a Blind Person
Regarding Mitzvot
By Rav Binyamin
Tabory
In our parasha, Yitzchak asked Esav
to take his gear, hunt an animal and prepare a meal (Bereishit 27:1-4). Rashi comments that the request to take
his gear implies that he should prepare his knife properly so that the shechita
would be kosher. Yitzchak also
intimated that Esav should not steal the animal. In fact, Esav's reply hinted that if he
would not be successful in his hunt, he would steal an animal for his father's
meal (Rashi ad loc.).
The Kli Chemda (R. Meir Dan Plotzki)
and other Acharonim raised the question of why Yitzchak deemed it necessary to
tell Esav his halakhic requirements.
Would Esav, who was so meticulous in honoring his father, have brought
him non-kosher food? Even if Esav would be personally inclined to steal, how
could he give stolen food to his revered father?
One answer is that inasmuch as
Yitzchak was legally blind, Esav felt that his father was exempt from all
halakhic obligations. It therefore
follows that Yitzchak could eat non-kosher or even stolen food. However, despite the letter of the law,
Yitzchak asked Esav to bring him kosher food.
Let us determine the halakhic status
of the blind and see if this answer is tenable.
The gemara (Kiddushin 31a) cites the
opinion of Rav Yehuda that a blind person is "patur" (exempt) from all
mitzvot. Apparently, this issue was
subject to dispute, as can be deduced from an incident related in that
gemara. Rav Yosef (who himself was
blind) offered to host a festive meal if he would be informed that the Halakha
follows the opinion of Rav Yehuda.
He felt that fulfilling the mitzvot, even though he was not obligated,
would reflect a great commitment to God.
However, he was told that the person who IS commanded and fulfills the
mitzvot is on a higher level than one who fulfills even though he is not
commanded. He therefore reversed
his position and said he would host the meal if he would be told that the
Halakha is not in accordance with Rav Yehuda, and a blind person is obligated in
all mitzvot.
The Peri Megadim (introduction to
Shulkhan Arukh, OC Part 3) maintains that, even according to Rav Yehuda, a blind
person is exempt only from positive mitzvot, but is obligated in all the
negative mitzvot (i.e. he cannot violate prohibitions). According to this opinion, no one would
permit a blind person either to eat non-kosher food or to
steal.
However, the Noda Bi-Yehuda
(Responsa 112 of Orach Chaim) questions this premise. He cites the Tosafot (Bava Kama 87a),
who say that even according to Rav Yehuda, a blind person is required by the
Rabbis to observe all biblical laws.
Tosafot assume that the Rabbis obligated the blind to observe mitzvot in
order that they would not seem to be non-Jews. The Noda Bi-Yehuda asks: if the blind
would be obligated in negative mitzvot, why would he not "appear" Jewish? He would not be allowed to work on
Shabbat or eat non-kosher food or eat chametz on Pesach. Moreover, one could argue that he would
have to make kiddush on Shabbat and eat matza on Pesach, inasmuch as they are
connected to a negative mitzva.
[The gemara (Pesachim 43b) says that anyone who is enjoined from eating
chametz must eat matza. The gemara
(Berakhot 20b) says that anyone who is forbidden to work on Shabbat must make
kiddush.] Therefore, the Noda
Bi-Yehuda reasons that the argument of Tosafot that a blind person would seem to
be not Jewish implies that he is not obligated in any biblical laws and could,
in fact, eat non-kosher food.
Would he also be permitted to
steal? The Minchat Chinukh (Mitzva
2) maintains that even if a blind person is not commanded in all biblical
mitzvot, his status is not less than that of a Noachide, and he must observe the
seven Noachide laws.
The Minchat Chinukh further adds (Mitzva 26) that he is
unique and differs from a non-Jew in several respects. Firstly, he would not be punished as a
Noachide. Secondly, whereas a
Noachide is not allowed to observe Shabbat, he would certainly be allowed to do
so. Presumably, the restriction of
teaching Torah to a non-Jew (Chagiga 10a) would also not apply to
him.
To summarize: there is an opinion
that a blind person is obligated in all biblical and rabbinic laws. Rav Yehuda maintains that he is exempt
from biblical mitzvot. There are
two ways to understand Rav Yehuda's position: a) he is exempt only from positive
mitzvot but obligated in negative mitzvot (Peri Megadim); b) he may also be
exempt from negative mitzvot (Noda Be-Yehuda), but it seems inconceivable that
he is not obligated at least in Noachide laws (Minchat
Chinukh).
Inasmuch as Rav Yosef was undecided
which opinion was accepted as halakha, there is a dispute among the
codifiers. The Ran (Kiddushin 31a)
says that since Rav Yehuda argued with Chakhamim, the general rule would be that
the halakha is like the majority.
Indeed, the Ran maintains that Rav Yosef himself knew this and merely
discussed the issue in theory.
Rabbeinu Yerucham (Sefer Adam 5:4) is one of the few scholars who said
that the halakha follows Rav Yehuda.
Latter day poskim, such as Arukh Ha-Shulchan (58a) and the Mishna Berura
(53:41), all follow the majority and say that a blind person is obligated in all
mitzvot. Even according to Rabbeinu
Yerucham, a blind person is required by rabbinic law to observe all
mitzvot.
The Rashba (Bava Kama 87a) clearly
argues with this opinion and says that the Rabbis did not obligate a blind
person to perform mitzvot according to Rav Yehuda.
It therefore follows that no opinion
would allow a blind person to steal, and it seems surprising that Yitzchak felt
it necessary to tell Esav not to steal.
On the other hand, it is permitted by biblical law for a blind person to
eat non-kosher food according to the Peri Megadim's understanding of Rav
Yehuda. Yitzchak did not wish to
eat non-kosher food and therefore told Esav to slaughter the animal
properly.