Seder Zera'im: The Laws Dependent upon the Land of Israel
Seder Zera'im:
The Laws Dependent upon the
Based on a shiur by
HaRav
Translated by
The objective of this shiur
is to provide an overview of Seder Zera'im and the main topics discussed
therein. There exist two frameworks
for the discussion of these issues.
The first framework consists of Seder Zera'im of the Mishna and
Talmud Yerushalmi, whereas the second framework consists of the Rambam's
Sefer Zera'im. Certain issues
and topics appear in the latter, but not in the former, e.g., the laws of
charity. I will address what is common to both.
I. POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE COMMANDMENTS
In a certain sense, the range of topics included in Zera'im constitutes a
distinct realm of Halakha, but in another sense, it embraces components that
parallel other realms.
In the first sense, we find positive and negative commandments. These mitzvot divide into two. There are mitzvot that include
an element of active fulfillment, such as: terumot, ma'asrot, challa,
bikkurim and the like. These
mitzvot are conditional, i.e., one's obligation in these mitzvot is
contingent upon particular circumstances.
Moreover, the fulfillment of these mitzvot requires positive
performance. There are other
mitzvot, which also belong to the realm of Zera'im, which do not
involve initiated action, but rather are fulfilled passively. These mitzvot are connected to
the realm of gifts for the poor. The
Torah states:
When you reap your harvest in your field, and have forgotten a sheaf in the
field, you shall not go back to fetch it; it shall be for the stranger, for the
fatherless, and for the widow: that the Lord your God may bless you in all the
work of your hands.
When you beat your olive tree, you shall not go over the boughs again: it shall
be for the stranger, for the fatherless, and for the widow.
When you gather the grapes of your vineyard, you shall not glean it afterwards:
it shall be for the stranger, for the fatherless, and for the widow. And you shall remember that you were
a slave in the
These are the
mitzvot of shikhecha, peret, and olelot. Regarding each of them, the Torah
states that the produce is to be left for the stranger, the fatherless, and the
widow. There is a negative
commandment not to go back for the forgotten produce, and also a positive
commandment that this produce belongs to the needy.
Regarding the mitzva of leket, the Torah states:
And when you reap the harvest of your land, you shall not wholly reap the
corners of your field, neither shall you gather the gleaning of your harvest. And you shall not glean your
vineyard, neither shall you gather the single grapes of your vineyard; you shall
leave them for the poor and stranger: I am the Lord your God. (Vayikra
19:9-10)
In this section, the
positive commandment is stated more clearly.
From the verses cited earlier regarding the mitzva of shikhecha,
one might have understood that there is no positive commandment; the Torah
merely means to describe the proprietary rights to the forgotten produce. But from the verses dealing with the
mitzva of leket, it is quite clear that we are dealing here with a
positive commandment. In any event,
the Rambam, both in his Sefer Ha-mitzvot as well as in Hilkhot Matenot
Aniyim, counts these obligations as positive precepts.
The mitzvot of leket, shikhecha and pe'a appear
under the same rubric, but there is a difference between leket and
shikhecha, on the one hand, and pe'a, on the other. Regarding leket and
shikhecha, a person is not required to do anything, whereas pe'a
involves an active setting aside of produce.
This raises a question regarding the relationship between the setting
aside of pe'a and the obligation to set aside terumot and
ma'asrot. Are the two
separations similar, in which case there exists an obligation to set aside
pe'a? Or perhaps, what is required in the case of pe'a is only that a
certain section of the field be defined as pe'a. In this case, there is a greater
resemblance to leket and shikhecha, which do not require setting
aside, because objective circumstances determine what is leket and
shikhecha. Another issue which
arises, and which appears to be related to the previous point, is whether it is
possible to obtain a release regarding the setting aside of a particular section
of the field as pe'a in the same way that it is possible to obtain a
release from the setting aside of particular produce as terumot and
ma'asrot.
Alongside the positive precepts, there are also negative commandments. These prohibitions divide into two
types.
First, there are prohibitions that relate to certain agricultural activities but
not to the produce in and of itself.
A striking example is the prohibition of kil'ayim. The prohibition of kil'ayim
applies even when there is no yield.
Second, there are prohibitions that relate to the produce itself. Regarding terumot and
ma'asrot there are no prohibitions relating to the act of setting aside the
various gifts. The prohibitions
relate to eating – what may and what may not be done with the produce before the
separation (tevel), and the actual fruits that are designated as
teruma or ma'aser.
II. SETTING ASIDE AND
THE PROHIBITION OF EATING
If we examine Rambam's Mishneh Torah, we find that Zera'im-related
issues appear, of course, in Sefer Zera'im, but there are additional
halakhot found in Hilkhot Ma'akhalot Assurot in Sefer Kedusha. These laws relate to the
prohibitions of eating related to zera'im: tevel, chadash, kil'ayim
of a certain sort, and orla.
Even though Rambam discusses all these areas in the same chapter, it is
important to note that there are differences between the various prohibitions,
both with respect to their severity, and with respect to the relationship
between the prohibitions and the obligations falling upon the owners of the
produce.
On this point there is a clear difference between chadash, orla, and
kil'ayim, on the one hand, and tevel, on the other. Regarding orla, it would seem
that the prohibition is not connected to the status of the owner, for the
produce itself constitutes an object (cheftza) of forbidden food. This point finds expression in the
discussion of whether the prohibition of orla applies to the produce of a
gentile. According to the simplest
understanding, just like a pig belonging to a gentile is forbidden, so too
orla belonging to him should be forbidden.
In any event, the Rishonim discuss this question at great length. This question also arises with regard
to chadash, for it too would appear to fall under the category of
"forbidden foods." The prevalent opinion is that the prohibition of chadash
applies to the produce of gentiles, but an opinion is cited in the Bayit
Chadash (Bach) that disagrees.
Tosafot discuss the issue with respect to kil'ayim, but the
simple understanding is that the prohibition applies even to the produce of a
gentile.
Whatever we have said thus far stands in sharp contrast to the situation
regarding tevel (untithed produce).
Regarding tevel, both the prohibition and the obligation pass
through the owner, and as a result, the tevel becomes forbidden to the
entire world. The prohibition of
eating tevel stems from the obligation upon the owner to set aside
terumot and ma'asrot; therefore, in the absence of an owner, there is
no obligation to set aside terumot and ma'asrot, and as a result,
there is no prohibition of tevel.
There are certain areas in which a question arises regarding the connection
presented here between the obligation falling upon the owner and the
prohibition. The most striking
example relates to the question of whether the sanctity of shevi'it
applies to the produce of a non-Jew.
If we say that the Torah imposed holiness upon the produce, there is holiness in
the produce of a non-Jew. But if we
say that the holiness is a function of Jewish ownership of the produce, and the
owner is obligated to renounce ownership of the produce, then the holiness
should not apply in the case of produce belonging to a non-Jew.
III. THE MONETARY
ASPECT OF THESE MITZVOT
Alongside all that we have said thus far, there is also a monetary aspect to
Seder Zera'im, which expresses itself in a number of ways. First, there is a
mitzva to set aside and transfer ownership of produce to another person. Ma'aser ani must be given to a
poor person. If ma'aser ani
is not set aside, the produce is forbidden as tevel; there is a
discussion regarding the severity of this prohibition, whether it is an ordinary
negative precept, or perhaps a graver prohibition, just like regular tevel.
It should be noted that this not the situation with all mitzvot dependent
upon the land. Regarding peret,
olalot, and the like, there is no obligation of giving; rather, there is
an obligation to allow other people to take of the field's produce.
There are monetary ramifications regarding terumot and ma'asrot,
but they are not all alike. In all
cases there is a mitzva to give, but still there may be a difference. The Ramban in Sefer ha-Mitzvot
(root 2) argues with the Rambam regarding whether setting aside and giving
terumot and the like constitute two mitzvot or one. The Ramban distinguishes between two
types of giving. It is possible to
argue that in the case of challa, the focus of the mitzva lies in
the giving, and the setting aside merely allows for the giving, whereas in the
rest of the mitzvot, there are two separate mitzvot, setting aside
and giving. In any case, the common
denominator is that there must be a transfer of ownership.
TOVAT HANA'A
Another monetary aspect of
these mitzvot is that of tovat hana'a.
Regarding terumot, ma'asrot, and the rest of the mitzvot,
with the exception of ma'aser sheni, the person who sets aside the
produce may chose to whom he wishes to give the produce. Chazal refer to this right as
"tovat hana'a." in several places, the Gemara
discusses whether this right has monetary value.
For example, the Mishna in Kiddushin (58a) states that a man may
betroth a woman with terumot and ma'asrot. Regarding this Mishna, the Gemara
states: “Ulla said: Tovat hana'a is not considered as having monetary
value.” It is clear to the Gemara that the kiddushin under discussion can
only work through tovat hana'a.
Thus, the Gemara comes to discuss whether or not tovat hana'a is
considered to have monetary value.
Even if we say that indeed tovat hana'a has monetary value, the monetary
right may be understood in one of two ways: 1) the person is owner only with
respect to the tovat hana'a; 2) he is in fact owner of the entire
teruma, but he is obligated to give it away, and that which is left to him
is merely the tovat hana'a.
This question has a practical ramification regarding a question raised by the
Ritva concerning a person who steals teruma: on what sum is he liable to
pay double.
All that we have said thus far relates to ma'aser rishon,
ma'aser ani, and teruma.
What is the monetary status of ma'aser sheni? There is a debate in
Kiddushin concerning whether ma'aser sheni is regarded as belonging
to God or belonging to man.
Regarding ma'aser
rishon, the Gemara records a dispute whether or not it has sanctity.
IV. SANCTITY OF THE
PRODUCE
Alongside all this, a question arises regarding the status of the produce, not
from the perspective of the prohibition, but rather from the perspective of its
sanctity. Ma'aser rishon,
ma'aser ani and all the other gifts for the poor have no sanctity
whatsoever. There is a whole
category of mitzvot regarding which there are laws of sanctity, on two
levels: what may be done with the produce, and what must be done with it. The first group is that of the
various types of teruma: teruma gedola, terumat ma'aser,
challa, and bikkurim, as the Rambam writes at the end of Hilkhot
Terumot (15:20):
Teruma gedola, terumat ma'aser,
challa, and bikkurim - are all called teruma. Regarding terumat ma'aser it
says: "Then you shall offer up from it a gift [teruma] for the Lord" (Bamidbar
18:26); and regarding challa it says: "You shall offer up a gift [teruma]
to the Lord" (Bamidbar 15:19); and it says: "You may not eat within your
gates the tithe of your corn... or offering [terumat] of your hand" (Devarim
12:17), and there is nothing that requires to be brought to a [particular] place
that was not specified in this verse, except for bikkurim, regarding
which it says: "or offering of your hand."
All these types of
terumot have sanctity (i.e., one may not defile it or destroy them and they
must be consumed only by a Kohen who is tahor at the time) and there is a
mitzva to eat them, but we are clearly not dealing with a single
mitzva, for there are differences between them.
Another group is made up of the produce of shevi'it; in addition to the
mitzva to eat of them, there is also a prohibition to do business with
them.
Tevel enjoys a double identity.
On the one hand, the prohibition of tevel is included among the
forbidden foods, but on the other hand, part of the problem is that it is
destined for separation. Therefore,
there are additional prohibitions, like the prohibition to throw tevel in
the garbage, the prohibition to defile it, and the like. These halakhot do not belong
to the realm of forbidden foods, but to the realm of zera'im.
BIKKURIM
As for bikkurim,
the situation is slightly different.
While, indeed, the Torah refers to bikkurim as teruma, bikkurim
has a certain unique element that is found nowhere else. Rambam mentions in two different
contexts that bikkurim enjoy the status of things consecrated for the
A tree worshipped as part of idolatrous rites that was [later] nullified - one
may not bring from it bikkurim, for bikkurim is like things
consecrated for the
And in halakha
19, he writes:
And so it seems to me, that bikkurim that became defiled may not be used
for fueling a stove as in the case of defiled teruma, because it is like
things consecrated for the
Bikkurim
are governed by special halakhot, because they are brought to the
There is a question. Why is a
special exclusion necessary? Surely it is stated at the end of the first chapter
of Kiddushin that every mitzva that is dependent upon the land
applies only in the
According to the second
answer, since the failure to set aside bikkurim does not cause the
produce to be regarded as tevel, it is therefore not considered a
mitzva that is dependent upon the land.
The question may be raised, however, whether the two answers in
Tosafot disagree about an issue related to bikkurim, or about the
criteria for determining that a particular mitzva is a personal
obligation. In any event, there is a
clear difference between terumot and ma'asrot, on the one hand,
and bikkurim, on the other.