The Sending Away of the Mother Bird
INTRODUCTION TO PARASHAT
HASHAVUA
PARASHAT KI
TETZE
The Sending
Away of the Mother Bird
By Rav Michael
Hattin
Introduction
Parashat Ki
Tetze is replete with many mitzvot that cover a very broad gamut of
contingencies and life events.
Bearing in mind that the people of
This week, we
shall focus on a brief series of verses that introduce an unusual mitzva. At first glance, the rationale for the
mitzva seems straightforward enough.
We will discover, though, that this mitzva in fact serves the
commentaries as a springboard for the formulation of a number of important
principles that are enunciated in the course of their
explanation.
The Observance and its
Reward
"If you come
across a bird's nest on a tree or upon the ground, containing chicks or eggs,
and the mother bird is roosting upon the chicks or upon the eggs, then you must
not take the mother along with the young.
You shall surely send away the mother and only then take the young, in
order that it might be good for you and so that you shall merit length of days"
(Devarim 22:6-7). This short
passage describes a deceptively simple ritual. If one comes across a bird's nest and
desires to take the eggs or the young birds, then one must first send away the
mother bird, presumably to spare her the pain of having her young ripped from
her feathery embrace. The text then
indicates a reward for proper observance: goodness and length of
days.
On the
surface, the mitzva of 'Shiluach HaKen' or the 'Sending Away of the Mother from
the Nest' seems to address the necessity of humane behavior. It is permitted to make use of other
creatures, but it is not permitted to cause them undue pain or emotional
suffering in the process. In
consonance with this obvious interpretation, a number of the traditional
commentaries draw a connection between this mitzva and others mentioned
elsewhere in the Torah that seem to address the same common theme: "You shall
present the first fruits of your land at the house of God your Lord, do not
seethe a kid in its mother's milk" (Shemot 23:19), "A cow and its offspring
shall not be slaughtered on the same day" (Vayikra 22:28). In all three cases, the Torah is
concerned with respecting the bond between animals and their young, whether in
the case of sheep, goats, cattle, or birds.
Rashbam and the Related
Mitzvot
As the Rashbam
(12th century,
In his brief
words, the Rashbam actually indicates that a careful reader of the text can
detect the Torah's desire to broaden these narrow 'ritual' observances into
character-shaping experiences.
Thus, we have one law that speaks of lambs or kids, and sheep or goats
(seething a kid in its mother's milk), a second law that mentions cattle
(slaughtering a cow and its offspring on the same day), and a third that
addresses birds (sending away the mother bird). In other words, the Torah desires us to
demonstrate sensitivity to ALL other creatures, especially those with whom we
tend to have the most interaction.
At the same
time, the Rashbam suggests that there is deliberation in the Torah's discussion
of COOKING a kid in its mother's milk, SLAUGHTERING a cow and its offspring on
the same day, and TAKING the chicks or eggs away from the mother bird. These three disparate acts describe
three different stages in the process of exercising our control over other
creatures. We take them from
nature, we kill them, and we prepare them for consumption. The Torah thus suggests that humane,
sensitive and compassionate behavior is required at every stage of our
interaction, even during the final juncture of cooking by which time the link
between the mother and the offspring has already long been
severed.
Ibn Ezra and
Reward
Rabbi Avraham
Ibn Ezra (12th century,
Thus far, we
have examined this mitzva and its rationale through the prism of the
rationalists. Simply stated, the
Torah demands of us to eschew mercilessness, to avoid excess, and to condemn
cruelty. Presumably, by exercising
restraint and demonstrating compassion to even the lower creatures, we may come
to behave kindly to other people as well!
Rambam and Expanding the
Principle
In his 'Guide
to the Perplexed', Rambam often links mitzvot together under broader categories:
"Our nutritional needs require us to consume other creatures…and therefore we
must slaughter them as humanely as possible. It is forbidden to torture them through
painful killing methods, or to sever limbs while the animal is still alive. Similarly, it is forbidden to slaughter
a cow and its offspring on the same day, in order to ensure that one does not
come to kill the offspring in its mother's presence. The pain that an animal suffers under
such circumstances is very great.
There is no difference between the pain of a human mother and the pain of
an animal mother, because love and compassion for one's offspring is not a
function of reasoning capacity but rather of innate feeling that many other
creatures possess. This law was
restricted to cattle and sheep, for these types are permitted for our
consumption from among the domesticated creatures, and among them it is possible
to ascertain the mother of the offspring.
A similar rationale animates the command to send away the mother
bird. In general, eggs that the
mother has already roosted upon as well as very young chicks are unfit for
consumption. When the mother is
sent away, she is spared the pain of losing her offspring. In fact, the person will often then
decide to leave the nest undisturbed, since the eggs or chicks are not edible in
most cases. IF THE TORAH SHOWED
CONCERN FOR THE PAIN OF OTHER ANIMALS AND BIRDS, ALL THE MORE SO WITH RESPECT TO
HUMANITY AS A WHOLE…I maintain that the mitzvot have a rationale and are not
simply Divine imperatives…" (Rambam, Guide to the Perplexed,
3:48).
Here, the
Rambam introduces a number of significant thoughts. Firstly, he draws a parallel between the
emotional capacity of higher animals and that of man. Although, humanity and other creatures
are separated by the unbridgeable chasm of reason, moral choice, and awareness
of God, with respect to innate emotion and feeling, we are the same. Every mother feels compassion for its
young and experiences intense pain when the natural bond of parenthood is
unexpectedly and cruelly severed.
However, explains the Rambam, the aim and objective of the Torah's
legislation are not only and not even primarily to create a kinder, gentler
world for animals, but rather to fashion a more compassionate world for
PEOPLE.
The Mitzvot and Human
Reason
The Rambam concludes his remarks
with what may be mistakenly regarded as an afterthought, but it is pivotal: "I maintain that the mitzvot have a
rationale and are not simply Divine imperatives…." Some of us may believe that
the mitzvot of the Torah are nothing more and nothing less than Divine decrees
that have no rational basis, and that from our point of reference are
arbitrary. According to such a
conceptual model, the attempt to comprehend God's commands according to logical
principles is misguided and unproductive.
Thus, to take our example, the mitzva to send away the mother bird has
nothing to do with inculcating compassion and kindness, but is simply an
expression of God's will. As the
Talmudic view advocating this approach states: "God's attributes are not
expressions of compassion and mercy, but rather definitive decrees" (Mishna
Berakhot 5:3).
Rambam
vehemently disagrees with this approach.
According to his view, the mitzvot can be comprehended rationally because
they have a rational basis. It is
the case that we must perform them because we are subject to God's sovereign
will and not because we feel that they are reasonable. At the same time, however, the mitzvot
are not to be construed as capricious acts that are to be performed solely as
expressions of our allegiance to the Supreme Being. Rather, the mitzvot are meaningful
activities that human logic and analysis can grasp and
appreciate.
Ramban's
Contribution
Like his
predecessors, the Ramban sees in this mitzva a condemnation of cruelty and
brutality. Like the others, he
connects it to the prohibition of slaughtering a mother and its offspring on the
same day. Like the Rambam, he
embraces the principle of a rational basis for the mitzvot, for "each one of
them is beneficial for the improvement of the human character, in addition to
carrying a reward from God who commanded them" (commentary to Devarim
22:6).
The Ramban,
however, finds it necessary to emphasize that when we say that the mitzvot have
a rational basis that is comprehensible and meaningful for man, that does not
imply that they are rational from God's perspective. In other words, the utility of the
mitzvot is exclusively one sided.
God, as an absolute and transcendent Being, derives no efficacy
whatsoever from our performance of the commandments. "Rather, their benefit is for humanity,
to save us from harm, to preserve us from false beliefs, to eliminate loathsome
character traits, to remind us of God's miracles and wonders so that we may come
to know Him…" (commentary to 22:6).
Towards the
end of his remarks, Ramban offers a puzzling comment that seems to undermine his
and the other commentaries' previous explanations. The Talmudic source that the Rambam
found troubling, namely that "God's attributes are not expressions of compassion
and mercy, but rather definitive decrees", is not a rejection of the attempts of
human reason to comprehend the mitzvot.
Rather, Ramban explains, it is an emphatic statement that "these
commandments concerning animals and birds are not acts of compassion towards
them, but rather decrees THAT ARE MEANT TO TEACH US PROPER CONDUCT."
Strangely
enough, Ramban seems to be suggesting that the command to send away the mother
bird or to not slaughter the cow and its offspring on the same day is not
motivated by the Torah's compassion for these hapless creatures, but rather by
its desire to see us nurture proper character traits. Of course, this appears
paradoxical. How are we to achieve
this 'proper conduct' that is the goal, except by demonstrating kindness and
compassion towards these cattle and birds?! Is the Rambam incorrect in proffering
that "there is no difference between the pain of a human mother and the pain of
an animal mother, because love and compassion for one's offspring is not a
function of reasoning capacity but rather of innate feeling that many other
creatures possess"?
The Difference Between Rambam and
Ramban
Clearly,
Ramban now appears to be rejecting Rambam's thesis, its eminent reasonableness
notwithstanding. But why? Considering the matter, it emerges that
Rambam's explanation may be somewhat limiting, precisely because it is so
reasonable! It may indeed be the
case that many animals suffer great pain when their offspring is wrenched from
them. It may indeed be the case
that to do so is cruel and brutal.
In fact, it is so obviously insensitive that it is difficult to conceive
of any reasonable person behaving so crudely. What human heart could see the suffering
of that mother and not be moved to compassion?
But, says the
Ramban, that is precisely the drawback of Rambam's thesis. The Torah does not only ask of us to be
compassionate towards cow 'x' or sheep 'y' or bird 'z', to exercise sympathy
when confronted with the specific situation of slaughter or the particular
episode of the bird's nest. These
are rather local occurrences that will no doubt elicit a natural and instinctive
stirring of concern from every human heart, excepting perhaps one made out of
stone. But very few of us will ever
engage in slaughter, and almost none of us will have occasion to come across the
bird's nest. And besides, the aim
of the Torah, as Rambam readily acknowledges, is not to be compassionate under
ONLY such circumstances, but under ALL circumstances, not ONLY towards these
animals, but also towards ALL animals, and ALL people.
How then will
we succeed in inculcating the compassion that the Torah so desires, so that it
affects every aspect of our lives and becomes part and parcel of our very
disposition? We may never have
occasion to perform this mitzva or others like it, for the unique set of
circumstances that are necessary for its fulfillment may not occur during the
course of our rather routine lives.
Conversely, we may have the opportunity to come across the mother bird
and send it away as the Torah requires, but how shall we incorporate that
singular event into the very fiber of our being so that it doesn't eventually
dissipate or else become a faded and tattered memory?
The answer,
says the Ramban, is to regard these mitzvot as OBJECT LESSONS. True, they may have specific and precise
applications that are to be realized in this coarse world of ours. They are not simply metaphors for good
living. But, at the same time,
there is a truth to these acts that surpasses their specific and relatively
narrow sphere of fulfillment, that addresses the broader problem of the human
condition and the recalcitrant human heart that can yet yield to God's healing
words. Having mercy on a specific
animal and bird may not be enough to develop a more refined character. The instinctual sort of identification
that occurs when a human parent witnesses the pain of an animal parent will not,
in and of itself, be translated into moral development. Moral development comes from constant
effort, from deliberate and prolonged study and contemplation of the good and
the upright, by the persistent and unceasing exercise of the moral will. Only by considering the sending away of
the mother bird as more (but not less) than a specific act, as greater than a
local episode, as rather a grand and comprehensive charge to develop a
benevolent and thoughtful character, can we do justice to its deceptively simple
rationale.
Shabbat
Shalom