The Sin of Nadav and Avihu and the Animals Prohibited for Consumption
PARASHAT SHEMINI
The Sin of Nadav and Avihu and the Animals Prohibited for Consumption
By Rav Amnon Bazak
A.
The Problem
In the aftermath of the tragic death of Nadav and Avihu, the
Torah suddenly interrupts the narrative with a command highlighting an
additional function of the kohanim:
And to distinguish between the holy and the profane, and between the impure and
the pure; and to instruct Bnei Yisrael concerning all of the statutes
which God spoke to them at the hand of Moshe. (10:10-11)
These verses set forth the framework for the chapters that
follow in chiastic order. First, the Torah discusses the differences between the
impure and the pure, in terms of the types of animals that may be eaten and
those that may not (chapter 11), and the various types of impurity and purity (Parashot
Acharei Mot, Tazri'a, and Metzora); thereafter, it addresses the
differences between the holy and the profane (Parashot Kedoshim and
Emor).
What do these categories and the differentiation between them
have to do with the sin of Nadav and Avihu? Why are the kohanim given the
new job of differentiating between the holy and profane and between the impure
and the pure specifically here, in the midst of the events of the "eighth day"?
In order to answer this question, let us examine the animals
forbidden as food as listed in chapter 11. We will find two groups of
prohibitions in this chapter, and we will discuss the connection between them
and the story of the death of Nadav and Avihu.
B.
"Impure" vs. "Abomination"
As noted, chapter 11 introduces the discussion concerning the
differentiation between the impure (tamei) and the pure (tahor).
The first part of the chapter is devoted to distinguishing between those animals
that may be eaten and those that may not, and it consists of four clearly
defined units:[1]
1.
Verses 2-8: "These are the beasts which you shall eat of all the animals that
are upon the earth
"
2.
Verses 9-12: "These you shall eat of all that is in the water
"
3.
Verses 13-19: "And these you shall regard as an abomination among the birds; you
shall not eat of them
"
4.
Verses 20-23: "These you may eat of every creeping thing that flies
"
There is an important difference between the first of these four
units and the three that follow. The first unit refers to that which is
forbidden as impure (tamei):
(4) But this you shall not eat of those that chew the cud and of those that are
cloven-footed: the camel, because it chews the cud but does not part the hoof
it is impure for you. (5) And the coney, because it chews the cud, but does not
part the hoof it is impure for you. (6) And the hare, because it chews the
cud, but does not part the hoof it is impure for you. (7) And the pig, because
it parts the hoof and is cloven-footed, but does not chew the cud; it is impure
for you. (8) You shall not eat of their flesh, and you shall not touch their
carcass; they are impure for you.
In contrast, in the following three units there is no mention of
"impurity." Instead, the Torah uses the word "sheketz" (abomination):
(10) And anything that does not have fins and scales in the seas and in the
rivers, of all that swarms in the water, and of all living things that are in
the water they are an abomination to you. (11) And they shall be abominable to
you: you shall not eat of their flesh, and you shall regard their carcass as
abominable. (12) Anything that does not have fins and scales in the water is an
abomination to you. (13) And these are to be regarded as abominable among the
birds, they shall not be eaten, they are an abomination: the eagle, and the
bearded vulture, and the black vulture
(20) All swarming things that fly, going
about on four legs, shall be an abomination to you.
This discrepancy in the terminology is not coincidental. We find
further that the animals and beasts that are forbidden as food, and which are
defined as such because they are "impure" transmit impurity even after their
death:
(24) And for these you shall become impure: anyone who touches the carcass of
them shall be impure until the evening. (25) And whoever takes up part of their
carcass shall wash his clothes and be impure until the evening. (26) Any beast
which parts the hoof but is not cloven-footed, and does not chew the cud, shall
be impure for you; anyone who touches them shall be impure. (27) And anything
that goes upon its paws, among all the beasts that go on all four, are impure
for you; anyone who touches the carcass of them shall be impure until the
evening. (28) And whoever takes up their carcass shall wash his clothes and be
impure until the evening; they are impure for you.
In contrast, those among the water creatures, the birds, and the
creeping things that fly which are defined as being forbidden because they are
an "abomination" do not convey impurity once they are dead.
What is the meaning of this difference?
C.
"I Wish To" or "I Have No Wish To"?
The question of why the Torah forbids the consumption of these
particular types of animals is one that has long engaged sages and scholars. On
the one hand, there is Chazal's well-known teaching:
A person should not say, I have no wish to wear sha'atnez; I have no
wish to eat the flesh of a pig
Rather, I wish to but what can I do; my
Father in heaven has decreed this upon me" (Sifra, Kedoshim,
parasha 10).
This suggests that there is no rational reason for the
prohibitions; they should be regarded as an expression of Divine decree, and the
careful observance of them as an expression of acceptance of the yoke of Heaven.
On the other hand, the Rishonim nevertheless suggest rational reasons for
these prohibitions, and over the generations these concepts have developed in
different directions.
Some, such as Rashbam (on verse 3), have addressed the physical
aspect:
According to the simple meaning of the text and the appropriate response to
heretics [who question these laws], all of the animals and beasts and birds and
fish and types of locusts and creeping things which God has forbidden to Israel
are disgusting, and they damage and infect the body, and therefore they are
referred to as impure. And even expert doctors say so, and likewise in the
Talmud (Shabbat 86b; Avoda Zara 31b): The gentiles who ate
creeping things and insects, sicken their bodies."
Others view the matter as pertaining to the spiritual realm, as
in Ramban's well-known comment (on verse 13):
The reason for the prohibition concerning [these specific] birds is because of
their cruel nature. This would apply to animals, because there are no animals of
prey among those that chew the cud and are cloven-footed; the rest devour prey.
It seems that both ideas represent "the words of the living
God," and each of approaches finds expression in a different type of forbidden
foods. The units in which we find the root "sh-k-tz" (abomination) would
seem to express a rational reason for these prohibitions. An "abomination" is
something disgusting. The same meaning is conveyed by other appearances of this
word in Tanakh, especially in connection with idolatry:
And you shall not bring a detestation into your house, lest you become accursed
like it; you shall consider it abominable and regard it as a detestation, for it
is a cursed thing. (Devarim 7:26)
And the mediums and the wizards and the images and the idols and all the
abominations which were seen in the land of Yehuda and in Yerushalayim
Yoshiyahu removed them. (Melakhim II 23:24)
It seems, then, that the water creatures, birds and creeping
things defined as "abominations" are foods that are meant to disgust a person.
Matters of impurity and purity, in contrast, generally belong to
a different mindset: they belong to the realm of "What can I do; my Father in
heaven has decreed this upon me." As the Rambam teaches (Laws of Mikvaot
11:12):
It is clear and known that the definitions of impure and pure are decrees of the
Torah; they are not of the sort of matters that a person could arrive at alone.
They belong to the category of statutes [laws that have no clear rational
reason].
The definition of prohibited beasts and animals as "impure"
therefore implies that the prohibition does not express a sense of disgust
associated with them; rather, refraining from them is an expression of
acceptance of the yoke of Heaven and God's laws, even when we do not understand
them.
This helps explain the dual conclusion of the chapter. First, it
mentions the prohibitions concerning abominable things:
You shall not make yourselves abominable with any creeping thing which creeps
for I am the Lord your God Who brings you up from the land of Egypt, to be your
God
to distinguish between the impure and the pure, and between the beast that
may be eaten and the beast that may not be eaten. (verses 45-47)
The emphasis is on the actual distinction between the impure and the pure even
though among animals there are none that are prohibited as abominations.
D.
The Message of the Story of Nadav and Avihu
Let us now return to our original question: What does the whole
subject of the animals forbidden as food have to do with Nadav and Avihu?
It would seem that the connection between the two parashot
lies specifically in the first of the four groups of forbidden foods those
whose prohibition expresses acceptance of the yoke of Heaven.
Let us explain. The sin of Nadav and Avihu is described in the
text in a simple and straightforward manner:
The sons of Aharon Nadav and Avihu took each his censer and placed fire in
it, and they put incense on it, and they offered a strange fire before God,
which He had not commanded them. (10:1)
Nevertheless, the commentaries propose different ways of
interpreting the sin (see, for example, the two explanations cited by Rashi, as
well as Rashbam's commentary). The multiplicity of interpretations seems to stem
from the question of why this act of the sons of Aharon was considered so grave
that they were deserving of death.
If we compare the sin described in the parasha with the
actions of Aharon and his sons as described previously, we find a sharp
contrast. Concerning Aharon and his sons, we are told:
They brought that
which Moshe had commanded
and the sons of Aharon brought the blood
before God,
as Moshe had commanded
and a fire emerged from before God and it consumed upon the
altar the burnt offering and the fat; and all the people saw, and they sang, and
fell upon their faces. (9:5-22)
In describing the episode of Nadav and Avihu, the Torah tells us:
The sons of Aharon Nadav and Avihu took each his censer
and they brought
before God a strange fire
which He had not commanded them.
And a fire emerged from before God and devoured them, and they died before God.
(19:1-2)
In both descriptions, the sons of Aharon take something and
offer it before God, and in both cases, a fire emerges from before God and
consumes. But in the first instance, the fire consumes the sacrifices, leading
to song, while in the second instance, the fire consumes those who are offering
the sacrifice, leading to weeping amongst the entire house of Israel (verse 6).
The reason for the huge difference in how these two instances of sacrifice play
out is set forth explicitly. At first, everything is done "as commanded;"[2]
but then Nadav and Avihu act as "He had not commanded them."
This is the root of the problem. Every religious experience, as
important and inspiring as it may be, entails a danger. Is man's purpose solely
to serve God, or is he supposed to satisfy his own need for a spiritual
experience?
The way to distinguish between them
concerns the question of "as Moshe had commanded them." So long as an experience
or action is undertaken within the boundaries of what is commanded, a person
sets limits on himself and his actions even in the midst of the spiritual
experience and is aware that he subservient at all times to God's word. When he
acts other than as he is commanded to, the question arises: Is this action or
addition really necessary, or even appropriate, for serving God?
Likewise they, in their joy once they saw a new fire, they sought to add
further love to the love that was already manifest. (Torat Kohanim,
Shemini, parasha 1).
The addition of their unnecessary and
superfluous act of "love" is what teaches us that on this historical day, the
day when the Divine Presence came to rest in the Mishkan, Nadav and Avihu
broke through the boundaries of Divine service and acted out of a quest for
their own personal spiritual experience. Thus, their act was a sort of avoda
zara a foreign worship and they were therefore deserving of death.
The tikkun (repair) for the sin
comes through an emphasis on the need to adhere precisely to God's command, and
it would seem that this is meaning of the unit on forbidden foods appearing
here. The acceptance of the prohibitions in foods that expresses nothing but
obeying God's command, with no rational reason, is part of the tikkun for
the fundamental deficiency which was manifest in the episode of Aharon's sons.
E.
"Could it be Accepted in God's Sight?!"
However, the Torah does not seek to simply
set down mindless decrees. Along with the lesson of accepting God's command even
where we do not understand it, the Torah presents a parallel system of forbidden
foods that makes sense to a person's intellect. The Torah is based on truth and
justice, on an understanding of man's nature and his ability to internalize its
messages. The message of accepting the yoke of Heaven and fulfilling God's
commands even if we do not understand them is important but not the sole
message. And indeed, most of the sections on forbidden foods do make sense.
Moreover, it seems that this concept is
expressed even before we reach the forbidden foods in the story of Nadav and
Avihu itself. Following their tragic deaths, Moshe discovers that the sin
offering which the kohanim were supposed to eat has been burned. The
Torah describes his response:
He was angry with Elazar and Itamar, the remaining sons of Aharon, saying, Why
did you not eat the sin offering in the holy place
and God has given it to you,
to obtain forgiveness for the congregation, to make atonement for them before
God?! Behold, its blood was not brought into the holy place; you should have
eaten it in the holy place, as I commanded!" (10: 16-18)
Aharon's response is:
Behold, today they offered their sin offering and their burnt offering before
God, and such events have happened to me; if today I had eaten the sin offering,
could it have been accepted in the sight of God?!" (verse 19).
What is the meaning of this dispute?
It seems that Moshe's conclusion from the
episode of the death of Aharon's sons is, as discussed above, the importance of
observing the mitzvot "as God commanded". He therefore adopts a series of
measures to ensure that everything will be done precisely in accordance with
God's commandments. He warns Aharon and his sons to continue their service with
no observance of mourning, lest further disaster befall them:
"Do not grow the hair of your head long, nor rend your clothes, lest you die and
anger come upon all the people." (10:6)
He then emphasizes the importance of
eating the parts of the sacrifices that are meant for the kohanim:
Moshe spoke to Aharon, and to Elazar and to Itamar, his remaining sons: Take
the meal offering that remains of the offerings of God made by fire, and eat it
without leaven beside the altar
for it is your due, and your sons' due, from
the sacrifices of God made by fire, for so I have been commanded. And the breast
that is waved and contribution of the thigh you shall eat in a pure place
and
it shall be yours, and your sons' with you, as your eternal due, as God has
commanded" (10:12-15).
Hence, it is not difficult to understand
Moshe's anger when he discovers that part of the service has not been carried
out as commanded:
"Why did you not eat the sin offering
you should have eaten it in the holy
place, as I commanded!"
Aharon defends himself by insisting that
some situations are exceptional; some situations require that one deviate from
the usual framework. Could there possibly be an act of eating to bring atonement
on the day when Aharon has lost two of his sons? As Rashbam expresses it:
How can I eat the sin-offering, of the food sanctified for all future
generations, on this day when our joy was spoiled and mixed? It would be like
the disgrace of a bride who commits adultery while under the very wedding
canopy!
Indeed, deviation from the usual
requirements is usually a sin, and sometimes it is even punishable by death. But
every case is judged on the basis of its own circumstances; an act that was
performed with extraneous motives is not the same as an act that befits the
situation as part of the quest for that which is good in God's sight.
Moshe's greatness is revealed in the fact
that he is able to understand this. The demand to observe absolute adherence to
regulations, with no consideration for changing circumstances, is also sometimes
not the correct approach in serving God. "And Moshe heard it, and he approved"
(10:20).
It is not at all easy to find the balance
between the complete subservience to God's command that is required of man, even
where the command does not appeal to his reason, and the understanding that
circumstances sometimes do make a difference, and that this too is a true
reflection of God's will. One of the ways to find the balance is to observe
these laws of forbidden foods, which include prohibitions that make sense as
well as prohibitions that we do not understand. In this sense, this unit in our
parasha represents an archetype for many different areas of the Torah,
guiding us in observance of the mitzvot and the service of God.
Translated by Kaeren Fish